How Much of a Body Shop's Work Comes From One Insurer

Short answer: Almost nobody publishes it; one company does. Boyd Group Services, owner of Gerber Collision and Glass, told securities regulators that its top five insurance clients are about 54 per cent of a 3.14 billion dollar business and one of them alone about 19 per cent.

By Anthony Braswell for Quorum Industries LLC, The Autobody Directory · Updated 2026-09-01 · How this was written, and what the machine may not do

How this page was produced: Researched, drafted and checked with AI assistance under human direction, and signed off by the named author. How this site is written

Everyone in collision repair says that being on an insurer's direct repair program means depending on that insurer. Almost nobody puts a number on it. This page collects the numbers that do exist. A typographic dash inside a quotation appears here as an ASCII hyphen and a trademark symbol is dropped; nothing else has been altered.

The one number that exists

[REPORTED] Boyd Group Services Inc. owns Gerber Collision and Glass and is the only large North American collision repairer we found filing audited statements and a written risk discussion. Its Annual Information Form for fiscal 2025, Exhibit 99.1 to a Form 40-F filed 18 March 2026 under CIK 0002091467, says this under the heading "Changes in Client Relationships":

"Of the top five insurance companies that the Company deals with, which in aggregate account for approximately 54% (2024 - 51%) of total sales, one insurance company represents approximately 19% (2024 - 16%) of the Company's total sales, while a second insurance company represents approximately 12% (2024 - 12%). Any loss or negative impact on these relationships could have an adverse impact on the Company's business and financial condition."

[REPORTED] Boyd's fiscal 2025 sales were 3,142,794 thousand US dollars. One unnamed insurance company is roughly one dollar in five of a 3.14 billion dollar business, and the top five a little over half. Resist the arithmetic that suggests itself: Boyd says "approximately" and gives no dollar figure, and a point of rounding on that base moves the answer by about 31 million dollars.

Five years, each row read off the filing that states it:

[REPORTED] It is not a straight line: concentration rose five points in 2022, drifted down through 2024, and returned to 54 per cent in 2025. It is not evidence of steadily deepening dependence.

What the arrangement is, in the repairer's own words

[REPORTED] AIF2025, same section: "A high percentage of the Company's revenues are derived from insurance companies ... The Company's ability to continue to grow its business, as well as maintain existing business volume and pricing, is largely reliant on its ability to maintain these DRP relationships." And, in the fiscal 2022 through 2025 disclosures alike: "The loss of any existing material DRP relationship, or a material component of a significant DRP relationship, could have a material adverse effect on Boyd's operations and business prospects."

[REPORTED] Then the mechanism, in the fiscal 2022, 2023, 2024 and 2025 filings alike:

"DRP relationships are governed by agreements that are usually cancellable upon short notice. These relationships can change quickly, both in terms of pricing and volumes, depending upon collision repair shop performance, cycle time, cost of repair, customer satisfaction, competition, insurance company management, program changes and general economic activity."

Boyd does not say how short "short notice" is. One state has bounded that clause by regulation, and that section is further down this page.

[REPORTED] The measurement, from the "Operational Performance" risk: "Failing to deliver on metrics such as cycle time, quality of repair, customer satisfaction and cost of repair can, over time, result in reductions to pricing, repair volumes, or both." Cost of repair sits beside quality of repair, and the penalty for failing on it is a cut to the repairer's own price or volume.

What is inside those agreements is worked through in The Rate Loop. [REPORTED] One specimen belongs here, and it is a different company's paperwork. A State Farm Select Service Agreement accepted on 14 April 2015 by Armando's Collision Center of Kenosha, Wisconsin, filed as an exhibit in the suit Armando's and two other Kenosha shops later brought against State Farm, binds the shop not to "disclose, distribute, or reproduce any part or section of the Agreement to any other person or organization" unless required by law. It also binds the shop not to "disclose, discuss, or share labor rate or pricing information with other repairers, and acknowledges this activity may be construed as illegal price fixing." The antitrust rationale is part of the clause and is quoted here for that reason. And the termination right is mutual on its face: "State Farm or Provider can terminate the Agreement at any time, and for any reason."

That is one carrier's form contract with one shop in one state in 2015. Boyd names no carrier, files no program agreement, and nothing we located shows what Boyd's agreements say. None of the terms above can be attributed to any Boyd relationship. What the two documents share is only the shape: a program agreement is not a public instrument, and the one specimen that is public became public because a shop sued.

[REPORTED] Boyd files no program agreement of its own. AIF2025, under "MATERIAL CONTRACTS": "Except as set forth below, BGSI, Boyd nor any of its subsidiaries have entered into any material contracts requiring disclosure pursuant to National Instrument 51-102". The three listed are the Joe Hudson's acquisition agreement and two credit agreements. No insurer agreement, twenty-five pages after the filing calls its volume and pricing "largely reliant" on those relationships. We do not claim any rule was broken; the text of National Instrument 51-102 was not reachable. What is established is the juxtaposition: no Gerber program agreement is public.

Boyd has never named a single one of them, and the instrument proves it

An absence claim is worthless without a control showing the instrument could have found something. [REPORTED] EDGAR full-text search over every document Boyd has filed with the SEC, restricted to CIK 0002091467:

It returns hits and misses on near-identical probes, so it discriminates.

Neither non-zero hit is a client disclosure. [REPORTED] Both sit in a Management Information Circular under "Directors and Officers Liability Insurance": the circular of 24 March 2026 records cover "under twelve separate insurance policies" and names all twelve issuers, Liberty Mutual among them, then names six more issuers of excess cover; the circular of 25 March 2025, which reached the SEC as an exhibit to the October 2025 listing prospectus, names "seven separate insurance policies" whose issuers include Travelers Insurance Company of Canada, with excess cover from Berkshire Hathaway and three others.

So: those two paragraphs name an insurance company twenty-nine times between them, and every one of those namings is an insurer selling Boyd a policy. Every carrier name we probed for returns either zero hits or a hit inside one of those two paragraphs. The insurers buying about 54 per cent of Boyd's output are named zero times. A shareholder can find out who underwrites the directors' cover and not who is 19 per cent of revenue.

[REPORTED] The same holds outside the SEC corpus, which matters because Boyd first registered with the SEC on 29 October 2025, for the NYSE listing it completed the following month. Those four carrier names appear zero times in Boyd's 2022, 2023 and 2025 annual reports and in its fiscal 2024 information form too, in each of which "Direct Repair Programs" appears two or three times as the positive control and a nonsense probe returns zero. "Labour rate" and "labor rate" appear zero times in the fiscal 2025 annual report and information form alike. "Labor rate" appears exactly once anywhere in Boyd's SEC filings, in the fiscal 2024 management discussion, where gross margin gains "were offset by labor rate margins which remained below historical levels." That is the entire treatment of the most-discussed number in the trade by the one repairer on this page that files a risk disclosure at all. Across all filers, "one insurance company represents approximately" returns six EDGAR hits, every one Boyd.

Down the ladder, the disclosure runs out

Order the industry by how much of the dependency anyone outside it can see, and the ordering tracks who is obliged to file rather than who is largest or most dependent. Boyd, second largest in the United States by location count on Moody's March 2025 figures, is at the top with percentages, because it is the one that files audited statements and a written risk discussion. Below it: Caliber, the largest, with a rating agency's sentence and no number; Crash Champions and the second-tier MSOs with nothing we located; the franchise brands; the dealer groups; and the independent shop, where we found no number at all.

[REPORTED] Caliber's SEC filing history under CIK 0001764691 is nine Form D notices and nothing else. What exists in place of a number is one sentence from Moody's, and read whole it is a credit strength rather than a criticism: a B3 corporate family rating reflecting weak credit metrics and interest coverage below 1 time for the period ended 30 September 2021, balanced by a leading market position with virtually full national coverage in a fragmented sub-sector and by strong relationships with national and major insurance carriers, which "represent the vast majority of its revenues."

[REPORTED] Four things cut against leaning on that line. It sits in an Announcement of Periodic Review of 28 January 2022 which says of itself that "This publication does not announce a credit rating action"; it is four and a half years old; it names no carrier and gives no percentage; and it is true of essentially every collision repairer, because insurance pays for most collision work whoever owns the shop. It describes who writes the cheque, not program dependency. The only reachable copy is a syndicated reprint whose line breaks were deleted without spaces, so the served text reads "reflectsits", "coverageof", "byits", "coverage -in", "strongrelationships" and "whichrepresent". Six word-joins in a single sentence, which is why the substance above is reported rather than quoted, with quotation marks only around the one run of words that survives the corruption intact. The corruption is itself a finding about the one public sentence on the largest US repairer's exposure.

[REPORTED] Crash Champions discloses nothing, but a Moody's credit opinion of 8 August 2025 says something favourable: size and cycle-time efficiency "provides the company with growth opportunities across a broad set of insurance carrier payors, and helps the company's negotiating position on matters such as reimbursement rates for labor and materials (pricing)." A disinterested party says scale moves the rate, and supplies no rate or method.

[REPORTED] The dealer groups produce the cleanest zero in the file. "Direct repair" and "DRP" appear zero times in each of the fiscal 2025 Form 10-Ks of AutoNation, Penske, Asbury, Group 1, Sonic and Lithia, all six from EDGAR and whitespace-flattened. The control ran in the same pass: "collision" returned 24, 22, 25, 17, 24 and 1, and a nonsense probe returned zero in all six. We are not saying dealer body shops hold no program agreements; the zeros establish silence toward shareholders, nothing else.

The ladder ranks visibility, not dependence: Boyd sits on top because it discloses.

The franchise rung, where the shop is not a party to the contract

One rung changes the argument's shape, because the shop doing the repair has no contract with the insurer. Everything below is from the Franchise Disclosure Document of ABRA Franchisor SPV LLC, December 2025 amendment, filed with the Minnesota Department of Commerce: a first-party disclosure required by federal rule.

[REPORTED] Item 1: "Abra has entered into agreements with certain insurance companies ("Corporately Managed Insurance Programs" or "CMIPs") under the terms of which CMIP partners may provide preferred access to participation in their direct repair programs ("DRPs") or performance-based agreements ("PBAs")." The franchisee signs the franchisor's Service Level Agreement to join one.

[REPORTED] The Franchise Agreement filed as an exhibit puts it in a phrase worth stopping on. Section 6(Q): "Franchisor has entered into verbal and/or written agreements with certain insurance companies". Some of the arrangements routing work to these shops are not written down, and that is not an isolated oddity: [REPORTED] California's regulatory definition of a direct repair program, at 10 CCR 2698.90, reaches an insurer's formal agreement with a repair facility whether that agreement is written or not. No words of it are quoted here: the only host serving that section refused every route we tried on the day, so the definition is reported from a summarising retrieval route and not from a full-text pull. The wall is recorded below.

[REPORTED] Item 17(a), on how long the franchisee's participation lasts: "The term expires, unless earlier terminated, on the date on which all of the master service agreements between us and/or our affiliates and our various insurance carrier customers expire or are terminated." Our various insurance carrier customers: the carriers are the franchisor's customers, and the shop's Service Level Agreement dies automatically when those master agreements do.

[REPORTED] Item 1, and limb (ii) is the one to read twice. Depending on the CMIP, a repair centre may be subject to "a bottom-line discount on the chargeable price of repair assignments in the next measurement period during the term of the CMIP, which bottom-line discount may be higher depending on your Repair Center's performance and other factors we determine if: (i) your Repair Center fails to meet certain key performance indicators established by the CMIP, and/or (ii) if the Abra Repair Centers that are participants in the CMIP collectively fail to meet certain key performance indicators established by the CMIP." The discount is a feature of the program before anyone misses anything. What limb (ii) adds is that a franchisee's own price can be discounted further because other franchisees it does not control missed a carrier's targets.

[REPORTED] And the closest thing to a dependency ratio in the franchise system, from Item 1: the customers include individuals seeking personal repairs, "although up to 85% of your business may be performed ultimately on behalf of insurance companies." That is a ceiling given to a prospective buyer, with no year and no basis, and it is not a measured share.

Massachusetts already regulated against "cancellable upon short notice"

One state decided decades ago that this relationship needed rules and wrote them: the cleanest evidence that cancellable-on-short-notice is a commercial choice rather than a law of nature.

[REPORTED] Under 211 CMR 123.00 the plan is filed and approved in public: on receiving one the Commissioner "shall promptly schedule a hearing", at which any "interested person, may file written materials in support of or in opposition to the plan" (123.04(4)). The same subsection carries its own exception, and it has to travel with the rule: no hearing is required for a plan the Commissioner determines does not substantially deviate from a previously approved one. And the selection criteria are closed. 211 CMR 123.06(3)(b):

"In determining which registered repair shops willbe referral shops, the insurer shall consider all of the following criteria, and only the following criteria: the quality and cost of repairs at a particular shop, the quality of the service given the customer, the responsiveness of the shop to the customer's needs, the ability of the shop to perform repairs without undue delay, the geographic convenience of the shop for the claimant, cooperation of the shop with the pre- and post-repair inspections and the shop's compliance with applicable laws and regulations."

The run-together "willbe" is the text as served, reproduced not corrected.

Boyd's four metrics all appear there in different words: quality and cost of repairs, repairs without undue delay, and quality of the service given the customer. The difference is not what gets measured. It is that here the list is exhaustive by regulation and anything outside it is impermissible. The same subdivision makes each insurer's guidelines "deemed to be a part of the individual insurer's plan" and makes admission presumptive: "A repair shop shall be included as an insurer's referral shop if the shop agrees in writing to comply fully with the plan," and the same sentence then carves out shops whose request is denied or whose agreement is revoked under 123.06(4) and which the insurer determines do not satisfy the listed criteria. The shop must also have "entered into an agreement satisfactory to the insurer" under 123.06(3)(a). Presumptive is not automatic.

[REPORTED] And 123.06(4) answers the cancellable-on-short-notice clause directly:

"An insurer may deny a repair shop's request to be a referral shop or revoke a referral shop's agreement, provided the insurer files a statement with the Commissioner specifying the nature of the shop's failure to comply with the plan or with the agreement or proposed agreement between the insurer and the repair shop. A repair shop which claims that it has been improperly denied as a referral shop or whose referral shop agreement has been revoked may demand arbitration."

The arbitration is binding, with costs shifted to the loser, no damages beyond costs and fees, and "The decision of the arbitrator shall be final."

The limits travel with it. This is one state, and a Massachusetts referral shop program is not identical to a program run nationally. We did not establish how many plans are on file, whether any statement under 123.06(4) has been filed, or whether any shop has demanded arbitration. We are not claiming this regime works, only that it exists.

What cuts the other way

The one operator where dependency can be measured shows no relationship between concentration and margin. [REPORTED] Boyd's gross margin ran 44.8 per cent (2021), 44.7, 45.5, 45.5 and 46.4 (2025), each read off the report that states it, against concentration of 49, 54, 53, 51 and 54. The two series do not co-move. Concentration reaches 54 twice: in 2022, the year of the lowest margin in the series, and again in 2025, the year of the highest. Boyd attributes the 2025 margin gain to internalising scanning and calibration, an increase in parts margin and "improvements in performance based pricing", not to its client mix. A naive dependency thesis predicts a pattern that is not in the numbers.

Boyd attributes its outperformance to the programs. [REPORTED] From the 2025 annual report: "the Company outperformed the industry, driven by the strong performance with DRP partners." In the same document Boyd estimates "a year-over-year decrease in repairable claims within the range of 5-7%", against same-store sales down 0.2 per cent. Boyd held share while its market shrank, and says the programs are why. Moody's says something similar of Crash Champions: "Competitive advantages of MSOs relative to independent operators can be seen in their relative outperformance."

Named operators say the arrangement works for them. [REPORTED, the first published by the franchisor on its own site, so promotional.] Matthew Feehan has run Fix Auto shops in Minnesota since 2019. Of an earlier stint working at Abra he says "It opened my eyes to the power of a group", and the franchisor writes that he joined Fix Auto partly because he wanted his children to inherit a business with "brand recognition, insurance relationships, and room to grow." [REPORTED] The Hall family sold Steve's Auto Body, four Arkansas locations, to Joe Hudson's Collision Centers in September 2023, and Steve Hall Jr said of the buyer: "they're not coming in to just completely change everything."

The franchisor charges nothing for holding the carrier contracts. [REPORTED] ABRA Item 6 records the Central Review Fee as "Currently, 0% of applicable Gross Sales" against a reserved right to charge up to 2 per cent of the gross sales the carrier programs generate, and Item 11 obliges the franchisor to "Assist with submitting applications on behalf of a pre-certified Repair Center for participation in CMIPs, DRPs or PBAs". The same arrangement that leaves the franchisee outside the carrier contract is what gets it into the programs, and at present it pays nothing for that.

Boyd volunteers all of it, including the risk that its clients could "decide to source products directly, impose the use of certain parts suppliers on the Company or otherwise change the parts sourcing process." And nothing on this page is a finding against any program: the only pleading here is unadjudicated, and we ran no docket-wide search for judgments in either direction.

The joint that is inference, and is labelled as one

[ALLEGED] Pending, nothing adjudicated. In Glenn Lucero v. Crash Champions, LLC, No. 1:26-cv-05476 (N.D. Ill.), filed 12 May 2026, a former estimator pleads at paragraph 36:

"The ATE bonus was a sales-based bonus calculated using a predetermined formula: Plaintiff was eligible to receive (a) set percentage of all monthly sales above $170,000 if the location's Net Promoter Score ("NPS") exceeded 88%; or (b) a lower set percentage of all monthly sales above $170,000 if the location's NPS was 88% or below."

Boyd's filing names customer satisfaction among the metrics on which insurers set a repairer's price and volume. Lucero pleads that at a different company an estimator's bonus percentage turned on his location's customer satisfaction score. The link between those two facts is inference and is not established by any document we located. Nothing in the complaint says the NPS was a carrier's score, or that a carrier supplied it. Its own next sentence, described rather than quoted because a page-break stamp splits it in the filed PDF, defines NPS as a standardized customer satisfaction metric derived from customer survey responses, which a company can run for itself. No court has found it true, and the defendant's response was not retrieved.

Without inference, the same quantity, customer satisfaction at one location, appears on both sides of the boundary: as a metric a public filing says moves a repairer's price, and as the pleaded gate on an estimator's bonus. One MSO pay plan would close it. We do not claim it is closed.

What we could not establish, and the walls

• The identity of any of Boyd's insurance clients. Established as an absence

by a controlled instrument, not filled in from anywhere.

• Any dependency ratio for any operator but Boyd, or the notice period in any agreement. No agreement was obtained.
• What "performance based pricing" means. Boyd names improvements in it as a

driver of its fiscal 2025 margin gain and defines it nowhere.

• Whether the NPS in the Lucero pleading is a carrier's score. See above.
• Whether National Instrument 51-102 required Boyd to file any agreement.

[WALL] www.osc.ca returned 403 to one route and 404 to another on the path tried; canlii.org is robots-disallowed.

• Any carrier's performance thresholds. We located no published scorecard with

numbers for any program. Progressive's Service and Repair Standards, the only such document we found published by a carrier, set deadlines such as logging in "at least four times throughout the day" and require a level of service "in terms of scheduling priority, cycle time and quality" at least equal to what the shop gives any other carrier. That is a relative standard. No numeric rate and no cycle-time figure appear.

• Whether any court or regulator has ever held that program participation harmed a shop, a technician or a consumer. No docket-wide or regulator-wide

search was run. Nothing here establishes it in either direction.

• Any fifty-state position on filing requirements. California and

Massachusetts were established first-hand; no fifty-state scan was run, and absence of a found rule elsewhere is not proof that none exists.

• The Massachusetts rate comparison, weaker than usually reported. The state

survey found insurers paying a 49 dollar weighted-average body labour rate against a 68 dollar mean charged by shops, on 476 usable shop responses from 1,497 shops surveyed, 463 of them answering on body labour, against 16 of the 17 insurers writing 1 per cent or more of the state's policies.

• [WALL] The only reachable Moody's copy for the Caliber sentence is the

corrupted reprint; moodys.com requires registration. Not public at all: any Gerber, Caliber or Crash Champions program agreement; Caliber's draft Form S-1; California's non-public per-shop survey data; any insurer's applied guidelines under 123.06(3)(b).

• [WALL] regulations.justia.com returned HTTP 403 to every route tried on

2026-09-01, including a full browser header set and a rendering fetcher, even though its robots.txt permits that path. That is why 10 CCR 2698.90 is described and not quoted. dockets.justia.com returned HTTP 403 on the same day, so the Lucero docket was not re-checked against the complaint.

Related

• Who actually signs the agreement with your insurer
• Paid for a time the database chose
• What your insurer owes you if it picks the shop
• Who pays for your collision repair, and what the documents show

Sources

Every quotation on this page was string-matched against a full-text pull, and every one was re-pulled and re-matched on 2026-09-01 by a checker who did not write the page. Where a source could not be re-pulled, the quotation was removed rather than kept.

• Boyd AIF fiscal 2025, EX-99.1 to Form 40-F, CIK 0002091467, accession

0001193125-26-112466, filed 18 March 2026. Read on 2026-09-01. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2091467/000119312526112466/d106626dex991.htm

• Boyd AIF fiscal 2024, dated 18 March 2025, filed with the SEC as EX-4.1 to the

Form F-10 of 29 October 2025, accession 0001193125-25-256324, whose EX-4.3 is the fiscal 2024 management discussion and whose EX-4.6 is the Management Information Circular of 25 March 2025. Read on 2026-09-01. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/2091467/000119312525256324/d77213dex41.htm

• Boyd Annual Reports 2025, 2023 and 2022, and the Management Information

Circular of 24 March 2026. Read on 2026-09-01. https://s25.q4cdn.com/123825503/files/doc_financials/2025/ar/2025-Annual-Report.pdf

• EDGAR full-text search, the submissions index for Caliber Holdings Inc. (CIK

0001764691), and the six dealer-group fiscal 2025 Form 10-Ks named above. Read on 2026-09-01. https://efts.sec.gov/LATEST/search-index

• ABRA Franchisor SPV LLC FDD, December 2025 amendment, Minnesota Department of

Commerce document 35181-202512-04. Read on 2026-09-01. https://cards.web.commerce.state.mn.us/franchise-registrations

• Moody's, Announcement of Periodic Review, Wand NewCo 3, Inc., 28 January 2022,

via reprint. Read on 2026-09-01. https://finance.yahoo.com/news/wand-newco-3-inc-moodys-170608451.html

• Moody's credit opinion 1455621, Champions Financing, Inc., 8 August 2025.

Read on 2026-09-01. https://www.repairerdrivennews.com/wp-content/uploads/2025/08/Moodys-Ratings-Credit_Opinion-Champions-Financing-Inc-Update-08Aug2025-PBC_1455621-2.pdf

• 211 CMR 123.04 and 123.06, pulled as full text and string-matched. Read on

2026-09-01. https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/massachusetts/211-CMR-123-04 and https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/massachusetts/211-CMR-123-06

• 10 CCR 2698.90, described and not quoted, the host having refused every route

on the day. https://regulations.justia.com/states/california/title-10/chapter-5/subchapter-9/article-7/section-2698-90/

• State Farm Select Service Agreement, seven pages, accepted and dated 14 April

2015 by Armando's Collision Center of Kenosha, Wisconsin, marked EXHIBIT A and published by Repairer Driven News in its coverage of the suit brought against State Farm by Pulera Collision, Armando's Collision and Jay-Bee Collision Repair Center. The exhibit itself carries no case caption. Read on 2026-09-01. https://www.repairerdrivennews.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/pulera-v-state-farm-20161104-exhibit-select-service-agreement.pdf

• Complaint in Lucero v. Crash Champions, LLC, No. 1:26-cv-05476 (N.D. Ill.).

Read on 2026-09-01. https://www.classaction.org/media/lucero-v-crash-champions-llc.pdf

• Progressive Service and Repair Standards; Massachusetts Auto Body Labor Rate

Advisory Board report, 22 December 2025; Driven Brands on Matthew Feehan; Autobody News, 19 September 2024. Read on 2026-09-01. https://malegislature.gov/Bills/194/HD5573.pdf

Rejected

1. A precise dollar figure for Boyd's largest insurance client. Cut.

Multiplying an "approximately 19%" by a rounded sales figure produces a number Boyd never stated, inside a band of tens of millions.

2. The full Moody's sentence on Caliber, as a quotation. The served copy runs

six word-pairs together where its line breaks were deleted, so the sentence is reported as content and quotation marks appear only around the one clean run of words. Restoring the missing spaces would mean publishing a repaired quotation as a verbatim one.

3. A claim that Boyd estimated a 5 to 7 per cent decline in repairable claims, as first drafted. Corrected, not cut: "5% to 7%" in the 2025 annual report

is a growth target. The claim decline is stated separately as "5-7%".

4. Any assertion that Boyd did or did not comply with National Instrument 51-102. Cut; the instrument could not be reached.
5. Cal. Ins. Code 758, and the quoted text of 10 CCR 2698.90. Section 758 is

not used on this page and has been dropped from the source list. The 2698.90 quotation was cut to a description when the host serving that section returned 403 to every route tried.

6. Two quotations that would not string-match as first drafted. The ABRA

6(Q) quote had gained a sentence-ending period the source lacks, and the complaint's NPS definition is split by a page-break stamp, so it is described rather than quoted.

7. The ladder as a ranking of dependence. Rejected in the text.
8. The claim that the State Farm agreement is the instrument under which about half of Boyd's revenue is transacted. Cut on the adversarial pass. Boyd names

no carrier and files no agreement, so no term of a State Farm form contract can be attributed to any Boyd relationship.

9. The claim that no court or regulator has ever held that program participation harmed a shop, a technician or a consumer. Cut on the

adversarial pass. No instrument was run that could have found one, so the negative was not ours to assert.

10. The claim that the disclosure ladder runs almost inverse to size. Cut on

the adversarial pass as false: the largest US operator by location count is Caliber and the second is Boyd, and Boyd discloses more.

11. The claim that the loss-of-DRP-relationship sentence is in the fiscal 2025 filing but not the fiscal 2024 one. Cut on the adversarial pass as false.

The sentence is in the fiscal 2024 information form, in the 2023 annual report and, split by a page break, in the 2022 one.

Corrections

• 2026-09-01. First publication. Three corrections were made during

verification rather than after it, and are recorded because the errors came from our own earlier research, not from a source. The list of carrier names absent from Boyd's SEC filings was incomplete: "Travelers" returns one hit, not zero, and that hit is the directors' and officers' liability paragraph in the 2025 circular, the same pattern as the Liberty Mutual hit rather than an exception. The claim decline figure at item 3 was corrected to the phrase the filing uses. And the Massachusetts and California quotations, earlier transcribed by hand from a summarising route, were re-pulled as full text and string-matched here.

• 2026-09-01, adversarial check. Every source was re-pulled by a checker who

did not write the page. Further defects were found and fixed before publication, all of them ours, and the material ones are these. The sentence about losing a material DRP relationship was said to be absent from the fiscal 2024 filing and is in it. The disclosure ladder was said to run inverse to size and does not. The quote from Matthew Feehan about the power of a group was said of Abra, not of Fix Auto. The Steve's Auto Body quote is Steve Hall Jr's, not Steve Hall Sr's. The Massachusetts admission clause was quoted without the exception that follows it in the same sentence, and 123.04's hearing requirement without its own exception. The State Farm confidentiality clause was quoted without the antitrust rationale attached to it and without the mutual termination right that sits four lines above it. Two claims that no instrument had tested were cut outright, and are at items 8 and 9 of the Rejected list.

• Corrections will be logged with the date. A program agreement, a scorecard with

thresholds, or an MSO pay plan would move this page furthest.

General consumer information: not legal, insurance, or financial advice. Requirements, coverage, and practices vary by state, policy, and manufacturer.

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