The Number Is the Payer's Number

Short answer: Virginia does not set a 75 percent total loss threshold. Its statute contains no percentage at all for a vehicle with an insurer on the claim. Instead it defines both halves of the test as the paying insurer's own determination, and it leaves the deduction unconstrained by any named source. That is the subject of this article, and so is the growing body of rules that requires the payer to show its working.

By Anthony Braswell for Quorum Industries LLC, The Autobody Directory · Updated 2026-09-03 · How this was written, and what the machine may not do

How this page was produced: Researched, drafted and checked with AI assistance under human direction, and signed off by the named author. How this site is written

Every quotation below was pulled again from its primary source and matched character for character against that source before it was printed. That was done on 2026-09-02, again by an adversarial review on 2026-09-03, and a third time on 2026-09-03 by a pass that read the Washington concise explanatory statement end to end, all 64 pages of it, instead of searching it. The third pass reversed part of the second. Four passages the adversarial review had cut as absent from the concise explanatory statement are in that document, at its pages 42 to 44 and 49, inside a two column comment and response table whose entries break across page boundaries; the review's search had returned false absences. Those four passages are not printed here, and the corrections log now records where they are. A fifth quotation, which the review introduced in their place, is not in the document at all and has been cut. Every quotation this article does print, from the concise explanatory statement, the CR-103P rule-making order, the CCC comment filing, the statutes, the regulations and the two opinions, was matched against the source as read on 2026-09-03. Where a quotation would not re-verify, it was cut rather than softened. Inside quotations, curly quotation marks and apostrophes are rendered as straight ASCII, and the line breaks and tab runs of PDF extraction are flattened to single spaces. A record citation dropped from inside a quotation is marked with an ellipsis. Nothing else inside a quotation is altered.

Virginia, where both sides of the ratio belong to the payer

Virginia's salvage chapter turns on an arithmetic comparison. A late model vehicle is a salvage vehicle if its estimated repair cost "would exceed its actual cash value less its current salvage value."

Both terms in that subtraction are defined in the same section, and both are defined as the insurer's determination.

Actual cash value "means the retail cash value of the vehicle prior to damage as determined, using recognized evaluation sources, either (i) by an insurance company responsible for paying a claim or (ii) if no insurance company is responsible therefor, by the Department."

Current salvage value "means (i) the salvage value of the vehicle, as determined by the insurer responsible for paying the claim, or (ii) if no insurance company is responsible therefor, 25 percent of the actual cash value."

Read those two definitions next to each other. The value being reduced is set by the paying insurer, subject to a loose constraint that it use "recognized evaluation sources." The amount it is reduced by is set by the paying insurer with no source constraint of any kind. And the deduction is the term that, when larger, makes the total loss test easier to meet.

Where the 75 actually comes from

The figure that circulates for Virginia is 75 percent. The statute does contain 75 percent, twice, and neither instance is the threshold for an ordinary insured collision claim.

The first is the recovered stolen vehicle: a salvage vehicle includes "any recovered stolen vehicle acquired by an insurance company as a part of the claims process, whose estimated cost of repair exceeds 75 percent of its actual cash value." The second is in the separate definition of a rebuilt vehicle.

The 75 that people attach to the collision threshold is not in the text at all. It is arithmetic, and it is ours: where no insurance company is responsible for the claim, current salvage value is fixed at 25 percent of actual cash value, so actual cash value less current salvage value equals 75 percent of actual cash value. That subtraction holds only for the uninsured owner. Put a carrier on the claim and the subtrahend is no longer 25 percent of anything. It is whatever that carrier determines.

We do not print Virginia as a 75 percent state, and on 2026-09-02 we corrected our own 51 jurisdiction salvage threshold table for exactly that error. The 75 percent belongs to the uninsured owner and to recovered stolen vehicles, and nowhere else in that section.

How many states we actually read

Our research file records the primary threshold instrument as read for 21 states across two earlier passes. The file's tally is that in 12 of those 21 the operative trigger for an insured collision loss is the insurer's own act, that is, declaring, determining, acquiring, taking title or paying, rather than any ratio, and that in 9 a percentage governs. Those two counts are the file's, and they count 21 instruments rather than the country. The file records 29 states as unread.

This article re-read 4 of those 21 threshold instruments at their own text: Virginia, Colorado, Washington and Oregon. The other 17 are carried forward from the file and were not re-verified here, so the 12 and the 9 are the file's running tally and not a figure this article stands behind instrument by instrument.

What we can stand behind is narrower and, we think, more useful. Of the four threshold statutes we re-read at their own text, not one imposes a percentage on an insured collision loss. We are not claiming that no state imposes a percentage on an insured collision loss. Four statutes were re-read here, seventeen more are carried from our file without re-verification, and the file records 29 states as never opened at all.

Oregon, which is Virginia's structure said plainly

Oregon defines a totaled vehicle in three limbs. The first covers the insured vehicle: "A vehicle that is declared a total loss by an insurer that is obligated to cover the loss or that the insurer takes possession of or title to." No percentage.

The percentage sits in the third limb, and its opening words do the work: "A vehicle that has sustained damage that is not covered by an insurer and that is such that the estimated cost to repair the vehicle is equal to at least 80 percent of the retail market value of the vehicle prior to the damage."

So the 80 percent that compilations quote for Oregon governs the vehicle with no insurer on the loss. And where it does apply, Oregon does something Virginia does not: it names an outside yardstick. "For purposes of this subsection, 'retail market value' shall be as reflected in publications relied upon by financial institutions doing business in this state."

Colorado and Washington, and the constraint Virginia lacks

Colorado's salvage vehicle definition runs to the insurer on both limbs. A vehicle qualifies where it "is determined to be a total loss by the insurer or other person acting on behalf of the owner or that the cost of repairing the vehicle to a roadworthy condition and for legal operation on the highways exceeds the vehicle's retail fair market value immediately prior to the damage, as determined by the person who owns the vehicle at the time of the occurrence or by the insurer or other person acting on behalf of the owner."

Then Colorado adds what Virginia omits. In assessing whether a vehicle is a salvage vehicle, "the retail fair market value shall be determined by reference to sources generally accepted within the insurance industry including price guide books, dealer quotations, computerized valuation services, newspaper advertisements, and certified appraisals, taking into account the condition of the vehicle prior to the damage."

That cuts two ways and both belong here. It constrains the insurer to identified categories of source. It also writes "computerized valuation services" into the statute as an acceptable one.

Washington compresses the same structure into a single clause. A salvage vehicle includes one "damaged to the extent that the owner, an insurer, or other person acting on behalf of the owner, has determined that the cost of parts and labor plus the salvage value has made it uneconomical to repair the vehicle." Repair cost and salvage value are both inputs, both sit inside one determination, and no percentage appears.

The vendor is not a loophole in these rules. It is named in them.

It is tempting to treat the computerised valuation system as something that slipped past the regulators. In the instruments we read, the opposite is true. Four of them name the product category as an approved source.

Colorado lists "computerized valuation services" among generally accepted sources. California permits "the cost of a comparable automobile as determined by a computerized automobile valuation service that produces statistically valid fair market values within the local market area." Washington permits a "Computerized source: The insurer may use a computerized source to establish a statistically valid actual cash value of the loss vehicle," subject to four criteria. Oregon permits "A valuation obtained from a computerized database source that produces statistically valid and fair market values for automobiles," subject to six.

The argument worth having is therefore not whether the software may be used. It is what the payer has to disclose about what the software did.

What the software does, from the court record and from the vendor

The clearest public account of the mechanism is in a published federal appellate opinion. In Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, the Eleventh Circuit described the calculation:

"To calculate the starting '[b]ase [v]alue' of Signor's Lexus, the CCC system obtained the dealer-advertised prices of 12 comparable vehicles, which were the same make, model, and year as Signor's vehicle. ... The vehicles' advertised prices ranged from $15,939 to $19,937. The CCC system then applied a 'Uniform Condition Adjustment' to the prices of the 12 comparable vehicles by deducting $1,064 each from their dealer-advertised prices. The purpose of the Uniform Condition Adjustment was to account for the difference between dealership vehicles that were in 'Dealer Ready' condition and privately owned vehicles that were in 'Normal Wear' condition."

Two things about that opinion have to travel with any account of it. The adjustment runs both ways: the court records that a second, "component condition adjustment" was then applied to Signor's own vehicle, and "Based on the above-average condition of Signor's vehicle, the component condition adjustment amounted to an upward adjustment of $589." And Safeco won. The district court granted summary judgment to Safeco, "concluding that it had not used an illegal methodology to calculate the vehicle's actual cash value," and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.

The vendor's own explanation of why comparables are adjusted downward is on a public regulatory record. In one filing in the CR-102 comment period, CCC Intelligent Solutions Inc. submitted four letters, dated 2025-08-08, 2025-10-06, 2026-02-03 and 2026-04-24, gathered into a single 19 page PDF in which the first three are attached to the last as Exhibits A, B and C. Each letter is signed "/s/Kathleen P. Lally" above the title Associate General Counsel. CCC also filed separately on the second prepublication draft, the third prepublication draft and the supplemental CR-102, and we did not read those three filings. What follows is the company describing its own method to a regulator, which makes it strong evidence of what CCC says and no evidence at all of whether it is correct.

"More specifically, CCC has Field Inventory Representatives that physically inspect vehicles on more than 3,000 dealer lots across the country to ensure the vehicles used as comparables are in at least 'Above Average' condition. If more than one component of a vehicle is not in 'Above Average' condition, CCC excludes the vehicle from its database. Similarly, CCC excludes listings from entire dealerships that are not reputable or that routinely sell vehicles in less than 'Above Average' condition. CCC also uses publications and data feeds only from industry-leading, reputable sources (e.g., Cars.com, autotrader.com, TrueCar) and applies search term and quality filters to these data feeds to automatically exclude from the comparable vehicle database dealer-listed vehicles that are not in 'Above Average' condition, or do not meet other quality criteria. On top of these quality checks on the front end of what comes into the comparable vehicle database, CCC employs further checks on the back end during each valuation to ensure that any comparable vehicle selected does not fall too far outside the statistical mode for the price of a dealer-listed vehicle of the same make/model/type as the loss vehicle at that time in the local market area."

That is a coherent answer to the obvious objection. The comparables are curated to be Above Average by construction, so a downward adjustment against a normal-wear loss vehicle follows from the curation rather than from anyone having looked at the particular car in the particular advertisement.

It is also the regulator's difficulty, for the same reason. We do not claim that CCC's account of its own filters is accurate. We read one of its four filings in this rule-making, and nothing on this page tests the description against the database it describes.

What the payer already has to show

California

California's automobile claims regulation is the most demanding instrument we read, and three of its sentences do most of the work.

On what may be deducted from a comparable: "Any adjustments from the cost of a comparable automobile must be discernible, measurable, itemized, and specified as well as appropriate in dollar amount and so documented in the claim file. Deductions taken from the cost of a comparable automobile that cannot be supported shall not be used."

A precision point that matters, because the sentence people reach for is the wrong one. The next sentence says "The actual cost of a comparable automobile shall not include any deduction for the condition of a loss vehicle unless the documented condition of the loss vehicle is below average for that particular year, make and model of vehicle." That governs a deduction for the condition of the loss vehicle. A uniform condition adjustment is a deduction from the cost of the comparables. It is the unsupported-deductions sentence, not the below-average sentence, that reaches it on its face.

On disclosure, and without the consumer having to ask: the cost of a comparable automobile "shall be determined as follows and, once determined, shall be fully itemized and explained in writing for the claimant at the time the settlement offer is made." That duty is unconditional. It does not wait for a request, it does not wait for a dispute, and it attaches at the moment the offer is made rather than at the end of an argument about it. It is the strongest disclosure right in any instrument we read.

On the comparables themselves: they "shall be identified by the vehicle identification number (VIN), the stock or order number of the vehicle from a licensed dealer, or the license plate number of that comparable vehicle if this information is available. The identification shall also include the telephone number (including area code) or street address of the seller of the comparable automobile."

And on salvage, which is the direct counterpart to Virginia's unconstrained deduction: salvage value "shall be determined by the amount for which a salvage pool or a licensed salvage dealer, wholesale motor vehicle auction or dismantler will purchase the salvage. If requested by the claimant, the insurer shall provide the name, address and telephone number of the salvage dealer, salvage pool, motor vehicle auction or dismantler who will purchase the salvage."

The same deduction, from the same consumer's settlement, is in Virginia whatever the paying insurer says it is, and in California whatever a named third party will actually pay.

There is also an audit right that is easy to miss, in the same paragraph as the itemisation duty: "Upon its request, the department shall have access to all records, data, computer programs, or any other information used by the insurer or any other source to determine market value." On its face that reaches the vendor's system, through the words "any other source." We found no instance of the California Department exercising it against a valuation vendor, and we did not search any state enforcement database, so treat it as a power on the page.

Oregon

Oregon requires the underlying material to be handed over unprompted: "When an insurer makes a cash settlement, the insurer shall furnish the insured copies of the information used by the insurer for the purpose of determining the amount of the cash settlement." Note the breadth. Copies of the information used, not a summary of it. That duty sits in section (3) of the rule, and section (14) applies section (3) to third party claimants as well.

Oregon also requires payment of the undisputed amount where the parties cannot agree on value, but the condition attached to it is material and is usually dropped when this is repeated: the insurer is not obliged to pay until the owner "Agrees to execute documents sufficient to transfer ownership of the automobile to the insurer" and authorises the insurer to move it to a disclosed location where it stays available for inspection "for not fewer than 14 calendar days."

Washington, as it stands today

Washington already tells the consumer what a valuation report must contain, and already makes one sentence do a great deal of work. Insurers "are responsible for the accuracy of evaluations to determine actual cash value."

The insurer must "Provide a true and accurate copy of any 'valuation report,' as described in WAC 284-30-392, if requested." That report must list the comparables with, for each, "The source of the information used," "The date of the information," "The contact information for the seller, the comparable motor vehicle's vehicle identification number, or both," "The seller's asking price," "The sold price, if available," and the location. Where a computerised source was used, "Any weighting of identified vehicles to arrive at an average must be documented and explained."

Every adjustment must be broken out: "Any additions or deductions from the actual cash value must be explained to the claimant and must be itemized showing specific dollar amounts."

And on salvage, Washington gives the consumer the California remedy with a clock on it: "Upon a request by the claimant, the insurer must provide the name and address of a salvage entity or dismantler who will purchase the salvage for the amount deducted with no additional charge. This purchase option must remain available for at least thirty days after the settlement agreement is reached and the claimant must be advised that the salvage entity may not honor its offer if the condition of the salvage has changed."

A Washington consumer who thinks the salvage deduction is too high can require the carrier to produce somebody who will actually pay it.

August 2026: Washington adopted the photographs

Washington adopted amended claims handling rules on 2026-08-18, effective 2026-10-18, in matter R 2025-05. The Commissioner's stated purpose is "to define unfair trade practices and to help clarify the minimum standards for claims handling in Washington state." Because the effective date falls after publication of this article, nothing in this section is law yet. Every duty described below is text that binds nobody until 2026-10-18.

Two paragraphs were added to the valuation report rule:

"(d) Upon request from the claimant, and if the insurer used condition of a comparable motor vehicle to reduce a payment to the claimant, then the insurer must provide to the claimant supporting photographs and documentation to demonstrate its determination of the condition.

(e) If the insurer makes a deduction of value of the loss vehicle's condition, it must provide to the claimant supporting photographs and documentation to demonstrate its determination of the condition."

From 2026-10-18, paragraph (d) will reach the reduction taken on the condition of a comparable, which is the uniform condition adjustment, and paragraph (e) will reach the deduction for the condition of the loss vehicle, which is the component adjustment. Paragraph (e) is not conditioned on a request: from that date, a Washington consumer whose settlement was reduced for the condition of their own car is owed the photographs behind that reduction whether or not they ever ask. Of the instruments this project read at their own text, which are four threshold statutes and the claims settlement regulations of three states, these are the only two provisions that reach either adjustment by name. We did not read the claims settlement regulations of the other 40 states, so that is a statement about what we read and not about the country. We are not saying Washington is the first state to require this, or the only one. It is the only one inside that reading.

One limit on the face of the adopted text, which we did not find stated anywhere else and which materially narrows the right. Both new paragraphs are lettered subsections of subsection (4), and subsection (4) opens: "When the insurer uses a computerized source for determining statistically valid actual cash values after meeting the requirements of WAC 284-30-391 (2)(b)(iv)". On the structure of the rule, both photograph duties are conditioned on the insurer having used a computerised source. From 2026-10-18, a Washington consumer whose adjuster reached the number through dealer quotations or advertised comparables is not obviously within either paragraph. CCC read the proposal the same way, describing its effect as falling on computerised valuations only.

What the Commissioner said she was doing

The concise explanatory statement for matter R 2025-05 sets out, in the Commissioner's own words, what the two new paragraphs are for:

"The Commissioner added subsection (4)(d) and (e), which state that when a computerized source is used to create a statistically valid value for a total loss vehicle, the insurer must provide upon request supporting information to demonstrate the comparable vehicle's condition if it makes a reduction in payment due to condition. Additionally, if an insurer makes a deduction in value for the loss vehicle's condition it must provide supporting documentation to demonstrate its condition. It is unfair and deceptive to the claimant if an insurer determines the condition of a comparable vehicle is worthy of a claim reduction but cannot provide documentation showing the comparable vehicle's condition."

CCC objected to that treatment in its own letters, where its words are quotable as CCC's: "Section 392(4)(d) also subjects computerized sources to disparate treatment without a clear and specified objective."

The Commissioner did not withdraw either paragraph. The concise explanatory statement records the only change made to them between the proposed and the final rule:

"The Commissioner simplified and matched language in subsections 392(4)(d) and (e) to reflect the similar requirements on insurers to provide to the claimant the supporting photographs and documentation to demonstrate the condition of the comparable, or loss, vehicle when it reduces the value of the claim due to condition of either vehicle."

The objection produced tidier drafting, not a narrower duty. The CR-103P rule-making order records the same change in the same terms.

The regulator answered the vagueness objection by requiring the photographs

CCC's April 2026 letter complained that the proposal, which then required only that "the insurer must provide supporting information of the condition that allows the reduction," was too vague to comply with: "The regulated community cannot tell from the proposed amendments whether photographs are required or sufficient (and if so, how many and from what angles)".

The adopted rule requires "supporting photographs and documentation." The ambiguity was resolved against the objector.

The record also shows movement the other way, and it should be said plainly. The "upon request" condition in paragraph (d) is in the rule as adopted. A consumer whose comparables were marked down has to ask.

The sentence with the most weight in it

Alongside the photographs, Washington amended the accuracy duty. The rule in force today reads: "Insurers are responsible for the accuracy of evaluations to determine actual cash value." From 2026-10-18 it reads:

"Insurers are responsible for the accuracy of their evaluations including, but not limited to, evaluations made on their behalf, to determine the amounts owed under the applicable insurance policy."

The added words are the point. An evaluation "made on their behalf" is the vendor's evaluation. The Commissioner's own explanation of that amendment is that "The Commissioner updated subsection (7) to clarify that insurers have a nondelegable duty to accurately investigate a claim and determine what is owed to the claimant under the applicable insurance policy." Among the authorities the concise explanatory statement lists as considered is "Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 668, 496 P.3d 347 (2021)." We did not read that opinion, we do not adopt any holding from it, and we report only that the Commissioner listed it.

That accuracy duty sits in WAC 284-30-380, in its present form today and in its amended form from 2026-10-18. The Insurance Fair Conduct Act enumerates WAC 284-30-380 by number as a rule whose violation triggers the statute's remedies, which are treble damages at the court's discretion and a mandatory award of "reasonable attorneys' fees and actual and statutory litigation costs, including expert witness fees" to a prevailing first party claimant. A claimant must give the insurer and the Commissioner twenty days' written notice before filing.

We flag one wrinkle we cannot resolve and on which we take no position. The statute enumerates the rule as "WAC 284-30-380, captioned 'standards for prompt, fair and equitable settlements applicable to all insurers'". The rule as codified today is captioned "Settlement standards applicable to all insurers." Whether the changed caption affects the enumeration is a question of law on which we located no authority. The two total loss rules, WAC 284-30-391 and 284-30-392, are not enumerated at all and would have to qualify under the statute's residual limb, which is a separate open question we also do not resolve.

What cuts the other way

A reader should finish knowing the counterweight, and it is substantial.

The method has been upheld when tested. Signor is published, and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the carrier on the methodology question. The complaint in this article is about disclosure and verifiability, not about the adjustment being irrational.

The curation argument is a real argument. If comparables are selected to be Above Average, then a car with normal wear is worth less than they are, and refusing to adjust would systematically overpay. CCC's account of its filters is specific and testable in principle.

CCC's operational objections are quantified, not hand-waving. In its own figures, from the letter of 2026-04-24: "approximately eight million unique vehicles in its comparable vehicle database" and "about 200,000 unique vehicles within Washington State"; "Over twenty million unique vehicles pass through CCC's database annually, with approximately 490,000 in Washington State alone"; "approximately 120,000 valuations in Washington in 2025" which "collectively included 516,000 comparable vehicles"; a compliance cost estimate "in excess of three million dollars"; and "between 6 and 18 calls to dealers to obtain a single quote." CCC also states it returns valuations "instantly" in Washington "about 77% of the time, with the reaming valuations taking about one business day to complete." The misspelling is in the source and we have not corrected it. The earlier letters in the same filing carry slightly different figures for the same quantities, and we quote the latest.

One CCC figure is worth keeping in view. Where a computerised source is used and more than thirty comparables are located, the Washington rules require only thirty of them to be listed, and expressly permit more. CCC states it "provides on average 4.37 comparable vehicles per valuation."

The discrimination objection is hard to dismiss, and the adopted text does not answer it. In CCC's words: "Under WAC 284-30-391(2)(b)(i) and (iii), comparable vehicles can be used to determine actual cash value without condition documentation, even if requested by the claimant. However, if the exact same comparable vehicles are utilized by computerized databases such as CCC, only then does the proposed rule require that 'supporting information' be collected to document the condition of the comparable vehicles. No justification has been provided for mandating documentation of the condition of a comparable vehicle only when accessed via a computerized database, without requiring the same documentation when identical vehicles are referenced through other methods." The same car, in the same advertisement, carries a documentation duty or does not according to which tool the adjuster used. The adopted text keeps that structure.

And CCC's claim that the machine beats the person is testable and untested. In its words, "the risk of a human adjuster doing so is likely greater than a computerized system like CCC's, which incorporates multiple quality control measures." Nobody has measured that, in either direction, so far as we located.

Finally, the best-drafted consumer rules in the country sit on a statute with no private action behind it. California's regulation is issued under the Unfair Practices Act and references Insurance Code section 790.03. In Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, decided 1988-08-18, the California Supreme Court held that "Neither section 790.03 nor section 790.09 was intended to create a private civil cause of action against an insurer that commits one of the various acts listed in section 790.03, subdivision (h)," and overruled Royal Globe. The court was careful to preserve other routes, and that qualification belongs with the holding: "apart from administrative remedies, the courts retain jurisdiction to impose civil damages or other remedies against insurers in appropriate common law actions, based on such traditional theories as fraud, infliction of emotional distress, and (as to the insured) either breach of contract or breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing."

What a consumer can actually ask for

Scoped to the three states whose claims settlement regulations we read at their own text.

In California, the itemised explanation of how the comparable's cost was reached is owed in writing at the time of the offer, without a request, along with the identification of each comparable by VIN, stock number or plate where available and the seller's telephone number or street address. An unsupported deduction from a comparable's cost may not be used at all. If a salvage deduction is taken, the claimant can ask for the name, address and telephone number of the buyer who will actually pay it.

In Oregon, copies of the information used to determine the cash settlement are owed without a request, to first party and third party claimants alike.

In Washington today, ask for the valuation report by name. That triggers the full list above, including each comparable's source, date, seller contact or VIN, asking price, sold price where available, and location, plus documentation of any weighting, plus every addition and deduction itemised in dollars. Ask separately for the salvage buyer, and note the thirty day option period.

In Washington from 2026-10-18, where the insurer used a computerised source, ask for the supporting photographs and documentation behind any condition-based reduction taken on a comparable. Where a deduction was taken for the condition of the loss vehicle, that material is owed without a request. Neither right exists before 2026-10-18.

What we could not verify, and the walls

Stated before the sources, because it bounds everything above.

1. Seventeen of the 21 threshold instruments were not re-read here. Eleven of the seventeen are named in our research file: Arizona, Massachusetts, Tennessee, South Carolina, Kentucky, Iowa, Florida, Georgia, Minnesota, New York and Texas. The remaining six are not named in this article. This article's own reading covers Virginia, Colorado, Washington and Oregon.
2. The research file records 29 states as entirely unread by this project. Nothing here is a fifty state survey.
3. No enforcement of any total loss valuation rule was located, against any carrier or vendor. We did not search any state enforcement database. That is an absence from a partial search, not a finding.
4. The Washington rule takes effect on 2026-10-18, which is after publication. Everything said about its effect is text, not outcome. No enforcement action, market conduct finding or court decision applying it exists yet, and none could.
5. Whether WAC 284-30-391 and 284-30-392 fall within the Insurance Fair Conduct Act's residual limb is unresolved and we take no position. Nor do we resolve the caption mismatch affecting WAC 284-30-380.
6. We did not read Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co. It appears here only as an authority the concise explanatory statement lists as considered.
7. We did not read ORS 742.466. For that reason we cut a claim that Oregon requires insurers to reimburse a consumer's appraisal costs as a general rule. The rule text we read makes that reimbursement part of one option inside the claim-reopening procedure, which is narrower than the general proposition, and the cross-referenced statute would have to be read before the general proposition could be printed at all.
8. We read only one of CCC's four filings in this rule-making. The filing we read is CCC's CR-102 comment, which gathers four letters. CCC also filed on the second prepublication draft, on the third prepublication draft and on the supplemental CR-102, and we did not open those three. Nothing here is a statement about everything CCC told the Commissioner.
9. We did not obtain the Washington Register citation for the adopted rule at first hand. The number appears only in the optically scanned Code Reviser stamp on the CR-103P, which is garbled, so we do not print it.

Walls and instrument failures, tested 2026-09-02 and again 2026-09-03. No site refused us in either pass, and the failures we hit were ours or our infrastructure's rather than a publisher's.

• Direct HTTPS fetching from this environment is blocked by our own egress proxy, which returned "CONNECT tunnel failed, response 403" on 2026-09-03 for law.lis.virginia.gov, app.leg.wa.gov, insurance.wa.gov, law.justia.com and law.cornell.edu. That is our proxy, not a wall at any of those sites; the proxy's own status endpoint records the rejections as policy denials at the gateway. Every document was then retrieved in full through the browser fetcher, each returning HTTP 200. Recorded because a proxy rejection can be mistaken for a site refusal and must not be.
• The Cornell California regulation path is a silent-zero generator. The citation must carry a dot. The hyphenated form of the 10 CCR 2695.8 path returns HTTP 200 with the wrong document and no error. We used the dot form and confirmed on all three passes that the page served is titled "Cal. Code Regs. Tit. 10, § 2695.8 - Additional Standards Applicable to Automobile Insurance" before quoting.
• Oregon's threshold statute was read at a republisher, oregon.public.law, not at the legislature's own server. On 2026-09-03 that page is marked "Current through early 2026" and names the legislature's ORS chapter 801 page as its source, accessed by the republisher on 2025-05-26.
• The Washington filing stamp on the adoption order is an image and its optical character recognition is garbled. It renders the filing date as "August.1I81, .2026" and the register number as "WSR 26-117-089". We therefore took the adoption and effective dates from the machine-readable body of the CR-103P rather than from the stamp, and we do not print the register number.

Instrument controls. The long PDFs were probed before anything was quoted from them, on all three passes. On 2026-09-03 the concise explanatory statement was not merely probed but read end to end, all 64 pages; the nonsense control string "zzqxjvphlum" returned nothing in it, while "nondelegable", "photographs", "CCC", "Kosovan", "illusory" and "made no changes" all returned hits. The CCC comment filing returned hits for "More specifically", "4.37", "reaming", "516,000" and "in excess of three million", and nothing for the same control string. The concise explanatory statement is a two-column document in which a comment and the response run side by side and break across a page; that structure is what produced the false absences recorded in the corrections log, and it is the reason the document was read rather than searched.

Sources

Read on 2026-09-02, re-fetched and re-matched on 2026-09-03.

• Va. Code section 46.2-1600, definitions. Page dated 9/3/2026 as served. https://law.lis.virginia.gov/vacode/title46.2/chapter16/section46.2-1600/
• C.R.S. section 42-6-102, 2025 text, subsections (17)(a)(I)(C) and (17)(b). https://law.justia.com/codes/colorado/title-42/certificates-of-title/article-6/part-1/section-42-6-102/
• RCW 46.04.514, salvage vehicle. https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=46.04.514
• ORS 801.527, totaled vehicle, read at a republisher. https://oregon.public.law/statutes/ors_801.527
• 10 CCR 2695.8, California. Note the dot in the path. https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/california/10-CCR-2695.8
• Or. Admin. Code section 836-080-0240. https://www.law.cornell.edu/regulations/oregon/Or-Admin-Code-SS-836-080-0240
• WAC 284-30-380, as codified. https://app.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=284-30-380
• WAC 284-30-391, as codified. https://app.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=284-30-391
• WAC 284-30-392, as codified. https://app.leg.wa.gov/WAC/default.aspx?cite=284-30-392
• RCW 48.30.015, Insurance Fair Conduct Act. https://app.leg.wa.gov/RCW/default.aspx?cite=48.30.015
• Washington rule-making order CR-103P, matter R 2025-05, 21 pages, containing the adoption date, the effective date and the adopted text of WAC 284-30-380, 284-30-391 and 284-30-392. It states the effective date as "Other (specify) October 18, 2026" and the adoption date as "Date Adopted: August 18, 2026", signed by Patty Kuderer, Insurance Commissioner. https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-08/r2025-05-cr103.pdf
• Concise explanatory statement, matter R 2025-05, 64 pages, dated August 18, 2026, read in full on 2026-09-03. It states that "The Commissioner filed the final rule (CR-103) with the Code Reviser on August 18, 2026, and the rule will become effective on October 18, 2026." https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-08/r2025-05-ces.pdf
• Rule-making page for matter R 2025-05. As read on 2026-09-03 it carries "Effective Date October 18, 2026" and "Date adopted August 18, 2026", and links the CR-103P and the concise explanatory statement as filed Aug 18, 2026. https://www.insurance.wa.gov/laws-rules/legislation-and-rulemaking/rulemaking/clarifying-and-updating-minimum-standards-claims-handling-r-2025-05
• CCC Intelligent Solutions Inc., CR-102 comment, four letters dated 2025-08-08, 2025-10-06, 2026-02-03 and 2026-04-24 filed as one 19 page PDF. https://www.insurance.wa.gov/sites/default/files/2026-04/ccc-intelligent-solutions-r2025-05-cr102-comment.pdf
• Signor v. Safeco Insurance Company of Illinois, No. 21-13148, 11th Cir., decided 2023-07-03, published. https://law.justia.com/cases/federal/appellate-courts/ca11/21-13148/21-13148-2023-07-03.html
• Moradi-Shalal v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Companies, 46 Cal. 3d 287, decided 1988-08-18. https://law.justia.com/cases/california/supreme-court/3d/46/287.html

Corrections

This log opens with this article and will record every subsequent change.

• 2026-09-02, on publication. This article corrects our own 51 jurisdiction salvage threshold table, which stated Virginia as a 75 per cent state. Va. Code section 46.2-1600 contains no percentage governing an insured collision claim. The 75 percent in that section applies to recovered stolen vehicles and, separately, in the definition of a rebuilt vehicle; the 75 percent figure attached to the collision threshold is arithmetic that holds only where no insurance company is responsible for the claim.
• 2026-09-02, on publication. Corrected from our own research file: the Washington salvage buyer option period is "at least thirty days" in WAC 284-30-391(5)(c). Our internal note had rendered it as "thirty calendar days." The rule as codified today does not say calendar. Re-checked on 2026-09-03 against both the codified rule and the adopted text; the codified rule reads "at least thirty days" and the version taking effect on 2026-10-18 reads "at least 30 calendar days."
• 2026-09-02, on publication. Cut before publication: a statement that CCC counts 27 of the top 30 United States auto insurers as customers. That figure does not appear in the four comment letters we read, and we verified it nowhere else, so we do not print it. Re-checked against the same filing on 2026-09-03, after confirming that filing returns hits for other CCC figures.
• 2026-09-02, on publication. Scope corrected before publication: Or. Admin. Code section 836-080-0240(3)(c) requires deductions to be measurable, itemised and specified in dollars, but subsection (3)(c) is the alternative valuation method that deviates from the database and comparable-purchase routes. It is not a general itemisation duty covering database valuations, and we do not present it as one.
• 2026-09-03, adversarial review, and 2026-09-03 correction of that review. The adversarial review cut four passages attributed to the Washington rule-making record on the ground that they did not exist at the cited source. A later pass on the same day read the concise explanatory statement in full rather than searching it, and found all four in that document. They are: the comment beginning "Opposition to 284-30-292(4)(d). Given the scale and frequency of total loss claims, it is not operationally feasible to individually validate the condition of..." with the section-number typo intact, at pages 43 to 44; the Commissioner's reply to it beginning "If the insurer cannot validate the condition of a vehicle it is considering telling the claimant is comparable to the loss vehicle" and containing "illusory and thus unfair and deceptive to the claimant", at pages 43 to 44; the exchange in which a commenter asks that the 284-30-392(4) requirements be "upon request" and the Commissioner records that she "included upon request from the claimant to 392(4) in the proposed rule", at page 43; and the Commissioner's response beginning "If an insurer utilizes information to make a claim payment under the policy, it is deceptive to their insured to say they cannot share where the information came from and when it was collected", at page 49. The strings "operationally feasible", "284-30-292", "48.01.030" and "illusory" all appear in the document, contrary to what the review recorded. The review's search had returned false absences, which the document's two-column layout and page-spanning entries explain. This article does not print those four passages. It rests instead on the Commissioner's own account of what she added and on CCC's letters.
• 2026-09-03. Cut: a quotation introduced by the adversarial review and attributed to the concise explanatory statement as a commenter's objection, beginning "Opposition to 284-30-392(4)(d) and (e), which state that when a computerized source is used to create a statistically valid value for a total loss vehicle". No such sentence is in the document. What the document contains is the Commissioner's own description of what she added, which begins "The Commissioner added subsection (4)(d) and (e), which state that when a computerized source is used...". The article now quotes that sentence, attributed to the Commissioner and not to any objector, and the surrounding claim that the statement "records an objection to both new paragraphs" in those words has been removed.
• 2026-09-03. Corrected: the article previously quoted the Commissioner as responding that "Washington courts have explicitly held that 'the duty to exercise good faith imposed on insurers under RCW 48.01.030 is nondelegable,'" citing Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co. That sentence is in the concise explanatory statement, at page 44, where the citation is given as "Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co., 496 P.3d 347, 361 (2021)". The adversarial review's statement that it does not appear was wrong. The article nonetheless does not print it, and says only what the Commissioner's Section 3.3 explanation says: that subsection (7) was updated "to clarify that insurers have a nondelegable duty to accurately investigate a claim and determine what is owed to the claimant under the applicable insurance policy", and that "Kosovan v. Omni Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 668, 496 P.3d 347 (2021)" is listed at page 6 among the authorities considered.
• 2026-09-03, adversarial review. Corrected: a quotation of WAC 284-30-391(4)(d) ended at "as described in WAC 284-30-392" and dropped the words ", if requested" from inside the quotation marks. The full clause is now quoted, and re-verified against the codified rule.
• 2026-09-03, adversarial review. Corrected: the Signor block quotation ran two sentences together across an omitted record citation, "Doc. 164 at 4." The omission is now marked with an ellipsis and the practice is disclosed in the note above.
• 2026-09-03, adversarial review. Corrected: the article said the Washington rule "lets a computerised source list up to thirty comparables." Thirty is a floor on what must be listed, not a ceiling. WAC 284-30-392(4)(a) requires that where more than thirty are used, thirty must be listed, and WAC 284-30-391(2)(b)(iv)(D) provides that the insurer "need list only thirty but may list more."
• 2026-09-03. Restored, with the count established at first hand. The adversarial review cut the description of the CCC comment filing as "one 19 page PDF" because two extraction passes over the same document had returned different totals. The document was retrieved again on 2026-09-03 and read through; it paginates as 19 pages, ending at page 19 of 19, and consists of the letter of 2026-04-24 followed by Exhibits A, B and C. The count is printed again.
• 2026-09-03. Corrected: the article said the Commissioner's rule-making page for matter R 2025-05 carried neither the adoption nor the effective date, and that the dates therefore came only from the CR-103P. As read on 2026-09-03 that page carries both, under the headings "Effective Date" and "Date adopted", and links the CR-103P and the concise explanatory statement as filed Aug 18, 2026. The two dates are now confirmed at three primary sources on Washington's own domain: the rule-making page, the CR-103P rule-making order, and the concise explanatory statement.
• 2026-09-03. Corrected: a CCC figure was quoted as "approximately 8 million unique vehicles in its comparable vehicle database". No letter in the filing carries that string. The letter of 2026-04-24 reads "approximately eight million unique vehicles in its comparable vehicle database"; the letter of 2025-08-08 reads "approximately 8 million unique vehicles in its databases". The article now quotes the 2026-04-24 wording and says which letter it comes from.
• 2026-09-03. Corrected: the signature block of CCC's letters was quoted as "/s/Kathleen P. Lally, Associate General Counsel". The source has no comma; the name and the title are on separate lines. The article now quotes only "/s/Kathleen P. Lally" and gives the title outside the quotation marks.
• 2026-09-03. Scope corrected: the article described CCC as having filed four comment letters in this rule-making. The rule-making page lists four separate CCC filings, on the second prepublication draft, the third prepublication draft, the CR-102 and the supplemental CR-102. We read only the CR-102 filing, which itself gathers four letters. The text and the limitations list now say so.
• 2026-09-03, adversarial review. Scope corrected: the statement that the two new Washington paragraphs are "the only rules in the country that reach either adjustment by name" now carries the boundary of what was checked, namely four threshold statutes and the claims settlement regulations of three states, and records that the claims settlement regulations of the other 47 states were not read.

General consumer information: not legal, insurance, or financial advice. Requirements, coverage, and practices vary by state, policy, and manufacturer.

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