The Shops Are Profitable. The Balance Sheets Are Not.

Short answer: Collision repair itself earns healthy margins. The large owners still report losses or thin profits because leases and borrowings sit between operating profit and the bottom line. At Boyd, the biggest single item in that gap is rent, not interest.

By Anthony Braswell for Quorum Industries LLC, The Autobody Directory · Updated 2026-09-01 · How this was written, and what the machine may not do

How this page was produced: Researched, drafted and checked with AI assistance under human direction, and signed off by the named author. How this site is written

[REPORTED] below is a document published by the party itself, a regulator, a standard setter or a rating agency: strong, cheap, and not adjudicated fact. [COMPUTED] is arithmetic done here over stated figures. No court or regulator has made a finding about any transaction here.

Two numbers that do not fit together

[REPORTED] Boyd Group Services Inc., which operates in the United States as Gerber Collision & Glass, reported sales of 3,142,794 and gross profit of 1,458,594 for the year ended 31 December 2025, in thousands of US dollars, on the statement of earnings in its Form 40-F. Its management discussion states a gross margin of 46.4 per cent and an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 12.0 per cent on Adjusted EBITDA of 376,306. Net earnings were 18,420: [COMPUTED] 46 cents of gross profit, 12 cents of operating performance and 0.59 cents of profit out of every sales dollar.

[REPORTED] The pattern sharpened in 2026. In the first quarter Boyd reported an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 12.3 per cent, that "Adjusted EBITDA increased 51.9% to an all-time record $122.4 million", and a net loss of 7,926; in the second, gross margin of 47.4 per cent, an Adjusted EBITDA margin of 13.4 per cent and net earnings of 1.3 million dollars. [COMPUTED] The two quarters sum to a loss of about 6.6 million dollars. The best operating half-year in the company's history produced a loss, and the reason is not that the repairs are unprofitable.

What we are not saying

We are not saying that body shops are unprofitable: every margin measured here is positive at the operating line. We are not claiming that consolidator-owned shops are worse businesses than independent ones, because nothing read for this article measures repair quality, cycle time, comebacks or customer outcomes. We do not claim any of this is unlawful: every transaction was announced by the parties or their own counsel, and in Boyd's case audited.

The bridge, line by line

[REPORTED] Boyd's fiscal 2025 reconciles exactly. Every line comes from the statement of earnings in the Form 40-F filed 18 March 2026, except Adjusted EBITDA, a non-IFRS measure stated in the accompanying management discussion.

Adjusted EBITDA 376,306 less depreciation of property, plant and equipment 87,851 less depreciation of right of use assets 128,101 less amortization of intangible assets 28,020 less finance costs, net 69,673 less acquisition and transformational cost initiatives 30,488 less fair value adjustments 3,449 equals earnings before income taxes 28,724 less income tax expense 10,304 equals net earnings 18,420

[COMPUTED] The subtractions are mine; the intermediate 28,724 and the final 18,420 are figures Boyd prints on that statement, so the bridge closes on its own numbers. Nothing in the ladder is a repair cost: cost of sales came out above the gross line and operating expenses above Adjusted EBITDA. Of the 347,582 the ladder consumes, 313,645 is depreciation, amortization and net finance cost, which is the cost of owning, renting and financing the estate; the remaining 33,937 is deal and transformation cost and fair value movement, which is neither.

Rent is the biggest single item, and it does not look like rent

[REPORTED] Boyd's lease note gives the 2025 income statement effect of leases: operating expenses of 12,497, already deducted before Adjusted EBITDA, plus depreciation of right of use assets of 128,101 and finance costs on lease liabilities of 44,825, which both sit below it.

[COMPUTED] 128,101 plus 44,825 is 172,926: 46.0 per cent of Adjusted EBITDA, 5.50 per cent of sales, 55.1 per cent of the 313,645 of depreciation, amortization and net finance cost, and 49.8 per cent of the whole 347,582 gap. It is the largest single component of that gap and just short of half of it. Not interest on borrowed money. Rent, restated by an accounting standard into depreciation and interest.

[REPORTED] The balance sheet at 31 December 2025 shows lease liabilities of 778,807 against stated borrowings of 360,783. [COMPUTED] That is 2.16 times, and the boundary belongs in the sentence: the same balance sheet carries 577,143 of senior unsecured notes on a separate line, issued in September and November 2025 for the January 2026 acquisition, and against borrowings and notes together the ratio is 0.83.

[REPORTED] The flow comparison needs no such qualification. The long-term debt note discloses interest expense on long-term debt of 32,707 for 2025; the lease note discloses lease finance costs of 44,825. Boyd paid more finance cost on its buildings than the interest it disclosed on its borrowings.

What cannot be said, and is not: the line is "Finance costs, net" at 69,673, while the two disclosed components sum to 77,532. It is net of items the notes do not break out, so subtracting one from the other for a non-lease residual would produce a number Boyd never published.

Why the accounting hides this

[REPORTED] FASB's In Focus summary of ASU 2016-02, Leases (Topic 842), sets out lessee expense recognition: an operating lease produces a "Single lease expense on a straight-line basis", a finance lease "Amortization expense" and "Interest expense". So under US GAAP an operating lease is one operating cost, above EBITDA. IFRS 16 has no such split.

[REPORTED] A joint IASB and FASB staff paper of June 2024, agenda reference 7B on both boards' papers, records at paragraph 29 that several investors noted "the lack of convergence results in costs and complexity for investors that follow GAAP and IFRS Accounting Standards filers, particularly because of the effects on the statement of cash flows and EBITDA", and at paragraph 24 that credit rating agency analysts "view all leases as having financing characteristics". Boyd reports under IFRS, so its lease cost falls below EBITDA; an American chain under Topic 842 takes the same cost above it. Same buildings, same rent, different number.

Run the comparison the other way

The cleanest test is Joe Hudson's Collision Center, a 258-shop chain Boyd bought and therefore had to describe. [REPORTED] Boyd's announcement of 29 October 2025 states: "For the trailing twelve months ended June 30, 2025, JHCC generated $722 million in sales, $63 million in JHCC Adjusted EBITDA and 8.7% JHCC Adjusted EBITDA margin. With adjustments to JHCC Adjusted EBITDA to approximate IFRS lease accounting treatment for operating lease payments JHCC Adjusted EBITDA was $104 million and JHCC Adjusted EBITDA margin was 14.4%."

The naive reading is 8.7 per cent against Boyd's 12.0, and it is wrong, because the bases differ. On the bridge the buyer supplied it is 14.4 against 12.0, and the private-equity-owned business is ahead. So run it the other way. [COMPUTED] Take Boyd's Adjusted EBITDA of 376,306, remove the 128,101 of right of use depreciation and the 44,825 of lease finance cost that Topic 842 would put above the line, and the result is 203,380, or 6.47 per cent of sales. On cash instead, using the 161,561 of lease repayments in the continuity schedule, it is 214,745, or 6.83 per cent, against Joe Hudson's as-reported 8.74. The answer does not flip: one direction puts the acquired chain ahead by 2.4 points, the other by 1.9 to 2.3. Neither Boyd figure is Boyd's own.

[REPORTED] And yet Joe Hudson's lost money: the same reconciliation prints a net loss of 23,200, interest expense of 55,575 and operating lease cost of 40,993 on Adjusted EBITDA of 63,116. [COMPUTED] Interest alone took 88.1 per cent of adjusted EBITDA, and the lease cost, 5.68 per cent of sales, had already come out above that line. Boyd's own lease charge is 5.50 per cent of sales, so the two chains carried close to the same occupancy burden per dollar of revenue.

Caliber, and where 1.213 billion dollars was headed

[REPORTED] On 31 January 2024 Simpson Thacher and Bartlett LLP, counsel to Caliber, announced that Wand NewCo 3, Inc., doing business as Caliber Collision, had completed an offering of "$1.25 billion aggregate principal amount of 7.625% Senior Secured Notes due 2032" plus "a new first lien term loan facility in an original aggregate principal amount of $2,725.0 million". Proceeds were to refinance existing debt, to "fund distributions to its parent entity in an aggregate amount of up to $1,213.0 million, which parent entity will in turn use to make distributions to its equityholders", and to pay fees.

[REPORTED] Cahill Gordon and Reindel LLP, for the lenders, titled its announcement "Cahill Represents Debt Financing Sources in $4.6 Billion of Debt Financings, Consisting of $3.35 Billion Credit Facilities and $1.25 Billion Notes Offering for Caliber Collision". Simpson Thacher puts the facilities at a 2,725.0 million term loan and a 625.0 million revolving facility, so part of the 4.6 billion is a commitment rather than cash drawn. [COMPUTED] 1,213.0 against 4,600.0 is 26.4 per cent. The borrower is the operating group; the recipient is the parent, and past it the equityholders.

Two boundaries travel with that. The phrase "up to" is a ceiling, not a payment, and nothing read here establishes what was distributed. And S&P had upgraded the company to 'B' stable in September 2023, four months earlier, and its research update of 8 January 2024 is titled on a less aggressive growth strategy; both reach this article as release titles alone, the bodies being walled.

Crash Champions: a default, a repair, and a rating

[REPORTED] On 13 May 2022 the trade press reported that Moody's had added a limited default designation to Service King, taking its probability of default rating to Caa3-PD/LD, the trade report quoting the agency that its "continued failure beyond the grace period to make its interest payment that was due on April 1, 2022 on its unsecured notes is a limited default". That is a rating agency's opinion, not a court judgment. [REPORTED] Eighteen days later, on 31 May 2022, came a recapitalisation whose subheadline reads "Capital Injection Strengthens Service King's Financial Position by Reducing Net Indebtedness by Over $500 Million", with "Service King will receive $200 million in new capital": the only de-levering event here not funded by a public equity issue.

[REPORTED] Service King then merged with Crash Champions. Moody's credit opinion 1455621 of 8 August 2025 rates the combined Champions Financing, Inc. at Caa1 with a stable outlook, describes a business with "LTM Q2 2025 revenue of about $2.8 billion" that "has 648 stores throughout the US", and states: "As of Q2 2025, LTM debt/EBITDA was about 9.1x on a lease-adjusted basis and about 15x on a funded debt basis while EBITA/interest coverage was 0.4x and free cash flow was -$61 million."

That is the lease question again: one agency, one company, one date, two leverage ratios 5.9 turns apart, the difference being lease treatment. Moody's publishes no components, so no EBITDA or lease liability is derived here.

[REPORTED] The same opinion names the mechanism generically: "Relative to companies that have more diversified ownership, private equity majority ownership creates risk of more aggressive financial strategies that benefit shareholders over creditors. These strategies employ greater use of leverage to finance rapid store growth, large acquisitions, and/or large periodic distributions to shareholders." That is a rating agency, writing for creditors, describing the Caliber transaction without naming it.

Boyd made the opposite choice

[REPORTED] Boyd's Q1 2026 interim report records that in its United States initial public offering on 4 November 2025 it "issued 6,361,800 common shares at a price of US$141.00 per share for net proceeds of $858,812". It had issued "C$275.0 million in notes due 2033" at 5.75 per cent on 4 September 2025, and issued "C$525.0 million in notes due 2030" at 5.5 per cent on 6 November 2025. It puts the total investment in Joe Hudson's at 1,321,435. [COMPUTED] The equity proceeds are 65.0 per cent of that, and the balance sheet agrees: shareholders' capital rose from 600,047 to 1,468,962 across 2025, and cash stood at 1,228,614 at year end against 19,997, held for a deal that closed nine days later.

One company arranged 4.6 billion dollars of debt financings with up to 1.213 billion earmarked to reach its owners; another raised most of the price of its largest acquisition ever from its owners and put it into the business. Both are ordinary choices. They are not the same choice.

[REPORTED] The deal brought its own occupancy with it: the purchase price allocation records right of use assets of 251,150 against lease liabilities assumed of the same 251,150, and [COMPUTED] Boyd's lease liabilities rose 36.0 per cent in the quarter, to 1,058,782. The rent moved with the shops.

The negative control: what the lenders' own marks say

If these companies were failing, their lenders would mark the loans down hard. Caliber and Crash Champions file no financial statements, but registered funds holding their debt file Form N-PORT, stating par balance and fair value per holding. [REPORTED] Every holding of either issuer in those four filings, dates from the repPdDate tag:

[COMPUTED] The last column is my arithmetic over the two stated tag values. N-PORT does not say whether accrued interest sits inside fair value, so these are prices to within accrued interest and should not be read to the decimal.

The two issuers separate. Caliber's post-recapitalisation term loan was marked at or within 0.11 per cent of par by two unrelated funds eight months apart, and its 2032 notes above par. Crash Champions, rated Caa1 with interest coverage of 0.4 times, is marked lower throughout: its notes at 89.7 and 96.7, and its 2024 term loan at 87.2, the lowest of the seven and the only holding here priced in the eighties. But seven marks across two issuers and four funds is not a price series, no trend should be read into the move from 89.7 to 96.7 across two funds, and a loan at par says what lenders expect to recover and nothing about the technicians or the customers.

[REPORTED] Ratings from three different agencies, on three different dates, and the coupons, rank the three issuers the same way, unadjusted for currency, tenor or security: Morningstar DBRS "finalized the provisional credit rating of BB with a Stable trend" on Boyd's senior unsecured notes of late 2025, which carry 5.75 and 5.5 per cent in Canadian dollars, against S&P's 'B' affirmed on Caliber in January 2024, whose notes carry 7.625 per cent, and Moody's Caa1 of August 2025 on Crash Champions, whose notes carry 8.75 per cent. Three scales and three dates are not one measurement.

The second negative control: the dealer groups are leaving too

If leverage were the whole story, operators outside the private-equity collision platforms would be expanding into the space. The largest are doing the opposite. [REPORTED] Group 1 Automotive told shareholders in its Form 10-K for fiscal 2025: "We are strategically reducing our collision footprint and repurposing a portion of that space to traditional service capacity, which we expect to increase returns from the higher margin service business." A search of EDGAR's full-text index restricted to Form 10-K, run on 2026-09-01, returned exactly one filing containing that phrase, and it is that one, accession 0001031203-26-000064. [REPORTED] AutoNation's Form 10-K for fiscal 2020 says it "owned and operated 74 AutoNation-branded collision centers"; its fiscal 2025 filing says "we also owned and operated 52 AutoNation-branded collision centers". [COMPUTED] A fall of 29.7 per cent over five years.

[REPORTED] Neither group is unlevered, and it matters to the control that they are not. AutoNation states that at 31 December 2025 it had "$4.0 billion of total non-vehicle long-term debt, $3.8 billion of vehicle floorplan financing, and $1.9 billion of non-recourse debt", and Group 1's debt note totals 3,712.7 million dollars. What neither carries is a collision-specific buyout structure, and both are cutting collision anyway.

That is a franchised dealer group, with the same customers and carriers, deciding collision repair is the worse use of the floor. Whatever presses on this trade, it is not only debt, and [REPORTED] Boyd says as much of its own year: "The decline in net earnings in 2025 compared to 2024 and 2023 was driven by reduced repairable claims volumes which resulted in decreases in both same-store and new location sales."

[REPORTED] The trade underneath them did not shrink. The Bureau of Labor Statistics Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages counts, for private establishments in automotive body, paint and interior repair and maintenance, NAICS 811121, 34,510 establishments and 229,974 average annual employees in 2015 against 35,422 and 257,163 in 2024, at an average annual pay of 45,935 dollars rising to 67,639. [COMPUTED] That is 2.6 per cent more establishments, 11.8 per cent more employees and 47.2 per cent more nominal pay across nine years. Consolidation did not thin the national count of shops, and it did not coincide with falling nominal pay in the industry as a whole.

What cuts the other way

[REPORTED] Boyd's gross margin is a real operating achievement, and the real series matters: 44.8 per cent in 2021, 44.7 in 2022, 45.5 in 2023, 45.5 in 2024, 46.4 in 2025, then 46.5 in Q1 2026 and 47.4 in Q2 2026. [COMPUTED] Down once, flat once, up four times, a net gain of 2.6 points. It did not rise every year. [REPORTED] Boyd credits "internalization of scanning and calibration, increase in parts margin, and improvements in performance based pricing", two of which are operational rather than price extraction.

[REPORTED] A single quarterly loss proves less than it looks: Boyd also reported a net loss in the first quarter of 2025, of 2,637. Its auditor recorded for fiscal 2025 that "management has determined that there was no impairment of goodwill or intangible assets", although that test covered the balance sheet nine days before the Joe Hudson's deal closed and could not reach that goodwill. Boyd's own leverage measure improved after the deal, its Q2 2026 release recording that "Pro forma debt leverage improved to 2.8x from 3.1x at the end of 2025", which is a pro forma figure and not an actual one, and Crash Champions had 648 stores while rated Caa1, so leverage did not shrink the leveraged operator either.

One structural bias has to be said aloud. Boyd supplies most of the adverse arithmetic because Boyd is the company that files: Caliber's SEC filing history at CIK 0001764691 is nine Form D notices and nothing else, re-checked on 2026-09-01, and every Crash Champions figure here reaches the public through a rating agency. Treating Boyd as the worst actor because it is the documented one has the causation backwards.

Who bears this, and who has not been shown to

Nothing here establishes that leverage reduced technician pay, and we are not saying it did; the only pay series read for this article, the national one above, rose. What is established is the order of claims: interest and rent are contractual and senior, equity returns residual, and a business whose interest takes 88 per cent of adjusted EBITDA has less discretionary cash for anything not contractually required. [REPORTED] Moody's says of Crash Champions that "Internal liquidity generation, however, has been insufficient to cover CAPEX investments resulting in free cash flow deficits." That is about capital expenditure, which buys frame benches and calibration equipment. It is not about wages.

For a shop that was sold, the documented consequence is that the business becomes part of a borrower's collateral and its cash flow part of a coverage ratio, as at Joe Hudson's, which [REPORTED] "has added 123 locations through acquisitions and 17 locations through new start-ups since the end of 2020" and then lost money for the year to 30 June 2025 while out-earning its buyer at the operating line. For a customer, no effect is evidenced anywhere in the material read here. Whether leverage degrades repairs is a question this record does not answer in either direction.

What we could not establish, and the walls we hit

• Any financial statement for Caliber or Crash Champions. Neither files one. The Caliber check has a working instrument behind it, since the same query returns nine Form D filings, so a zero for anything else is an absence in that CIK's record rather than a retrieval failure.
• Crash Champions' EBITDA or rent on any stated basis, because Moody's publishes ratios and a revenue figure but not those inputs; whether Caliber's 1,213.0 million dollar distribution was paid; and Boyd's non-lease interest burden, for the reasons above.
• WALL, S&P Global Ratings. https://www.spglobal.com/ratings/en/regulatory/article/-/view/type/HTML/id/3228059 returned HTTP 200 with an empty body by one route and HTTP 403 by another on retest today, so only the titles of S&P's actions are public. The date, outlook and rationale of its most recent actions on Caliber and on Crash Champions are not established here, and the S&P ratings cited above rest on titles alone.
• WALL, Morningstar DBRS research pages. https://dbrs.morningstar.com/research/466182/ returns site chrome with an empty body; the DBRS rating above comes from a wire distribution.
• Not a wall, and an earlier draft said it was. https://www.bls.gov/cew/data/api/2024/a/industry/811121.csv was recorded as refused by our fetcher as robots-disallowed. https://www.bls.gov/robots.txt carries no rule covering /cew/ for a general user agent, and the path returns 456 kilobytes of CSV on retest. The establishment series is in the article above because of that retest.
• One SEC request returned HTTP 503 behind a maintenance page and succeeded on retry. Every figure here was read from a page returning 200 with content, never from a status code.

Corrections

2026-09-01. The brief commissioning this article said Boyd's gross margin rose every year from 44.7 to 46.4 per cent. That is wrong, and the error had already travelled from an earlier brief into a source dossier, which repeated it as "It rose every year of the series". The verified series is 44.8 (2021), 44.7 (2022), 45.5 (2023), 45.5 (2024), 46.4 (2025): it fell once and was flat once. The endpoints support the claim; "every year" does not. This is the second time in this project that an error arrived in an instruction rather than a source, which is why the rule is to attack the brief along with the draft.

2026-09-01. An earlier draft was about to publish a non-lease interest figure of 24,848, computed as 69,673 minus 44,825. The line is finance costs net, and the two disclosed components exceed it by 7,859, so the subtraction is invalid. Cut, not hedged.

2026-09-01. Earlier research recorded sec.gov as blocked, which cost a previous pass Boyd's Form 40-F entirely. It is not blocked. An inherited wall that is never retested costs more than the wall itself.

2026-09-01, on adversarial review. Three entries in this article's own gap and rejected lists were false, and each verified on the first retest. The Bureau of Labor Statistics establishment series was recorded as unobtainable; the permitted path serves it, and the counts rejected as un-repullable are exact. A Crash Champions term loan mark was recorded as not found in the T. Rowe Price N-PORT filing; it is in that filing, at 87.2 per cent of par, and is now the lowest mark in the table above. Crash Champions' revenue was recorded as unpublished on any basis; Moody's states it in the opinion this article already quotes. A gap list decays exactly like the article around it.

2026-09-01, on adversarial review. An earlier draft called AutoNation "a debt-free operator" and headed its second negative control on "the owners with no debt". Both are false: AutoNation reports 4.0 billion dollars of non-vehicle long-term debt alone, and Group 1's debt note totals 3,712.7 million. The control is that neither carries a collision-specific buyout structure, not that neither borrows. Three dates and one proportion were wrong too. The Service King recapitalisation followed the Moody's limited default report by eighteen days, not six weeks; Boyd's two note issues were both dated to 4 November 2025 alongside the share issue, and were issued on 4 September and 6 November 2025; and lease charge is 49.8 per cent of the gap between Boyd's Adjusted EBITDA and its pre-tax earnings, the largest single component of that gap and not the majority of it.

Rejected

Claims that were in the research and did not survive re-verification today. Cut, not softened.

• Asbury Automotive's collision gross profit falling 2 per cent as reported and 5 per cent same store in fiscal 2025. The retrieval reached the front of the 10-K, not the Item 7 table.
• Group 1's collision centre count falling from 41 in fiscal 2023 to 32 in fiscal 2025. Only the 2025 endpoint re-verified.
• That Boyd's headline leverage measure excludes lease liabilities and is the most flattering available. The source returned two measure names attached to the same 2.7x figure, one "before lease liabilities" and one "after".
• Boyd's repairable claim volume declines of 7 to 9 per cent in 2024 and 5 to 7 per cent in 2025. Re-fetch returned a 5 to 7 per cent figure attributed to industry sources and a 2 to 4 per cent quarterly figure, so the years could not be tied down.
• Boyd's total location count of 1,307, not found on re-fetch; a fiscal 2023 finance cost of about 61,300, where the 2023 annual report gives 51,718; and a "BB (high)" issuer rating on Boyd, sourced only from a press release title.

Every quotation above was re-fetched from its primary source and matched programmatically against the full document text, whitespace and curly punctuation normalised on both sides, and then matched a second time on adversarial review from an independent fetch on separate hardware. The matcher returns negatives: on review it did so for a quotation carrying a stray superscript footnote marker, and for the store count until the right sentence of the Moody's opinion was located, that document using both "over 648 stores" and "has 648 stores" of the same company on the same date.

Related

• Who owns the body shop you are standing in
• Has consolidation actually reduced the number of body shops
• What Boyd's SEC filings say about consolidation, from the one large operator that files

Sources

Every source below was fetched and read on 2026-09-01.

• Boyd Group Services Inc., Form 40-F for the year ended 31 December 2025, the annual filing. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd consolidated statements of earnings. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd consolidated statements of financial position. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd lease note, statement of earnings effects. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd lease note, continuity schedule. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd long-term debt note. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd management discussion and analysis, FY2025, Adjusted EBITDA and the margin series. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd financial statements exhibit, FY2025, the auditor on goodwill. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd interim report, quarter ended 31 March 2026, the JHCC allocation. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd first quarter 2026 results release. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd second quarter 2026 results release, Q2 2026 and pro forma leverage. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd announcement of the Joe Hudson's acquisition, the JHCC reconciliation. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd 2023 annual report, 2023 figures. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Boyd 2022 annual report, 2021 and 2022 margins. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Simpson Thacher and Bartlett LLP on Caliber's January 2024 financing, the use of proceeds. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Cahill Gordon and Reindel LLP on the same financing, the lenders' side. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Moody's credit opinion 1455621 on Champions Financing, Inc., the Caa1 rating and metrics. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Report of Moody's limited default designation on Service King, the Caa3-PD/LD action. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Service King recapitalisation announcement, the recapitalisation terms. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Morningstar DBRS release on Boyd's senior unsecured notes, the BB rating. Read on 2026-09-01.
• FASB, ASU 2016-02 Leases (Topic 842) In Focus%20(Rev%206-3-20).pdf), lessee expense recognition. Read on 2026-09-01.
• IASB and FASB joint staff paper, agenda reference 7B, paragraphs 24 and 29. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Polen Floating Rate Income ETF Form N-PORT, a Caliber term loan mark. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Aristotle Floating Rate Income Fund Form N-PORT, a Caliber term loan mark. Read on 2026-09-01.
• T. Rowe Price OHA Flexible Credit Income Fund Form N-PORT, a Champions note mark. Read on 2026-09-01.
• PIA High Yield Fund Form N-PORT, a Champions note mark. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Group 1 Automotive, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal 2025, the collision footprint. Read on 2026-09-01.
• AutoNation, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal 2020, the 74 collision centres. Read on 2026-09-01.
• AutoNation, Inc., Form 10-K for fiscal 2025, the 52 collision centres. Read on 2026-09-01.
• Caliber Holdings Inc. SEC filing history, CIK 0001764691, nine Form D notices. Read on 2026-09-01.
• BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, NAICS 811121, 2024, establishments, employment and pay. Read on 2026-09-01.
• BLS Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages, NAICS 811121, 2015, the 2015 comparison. Read on 2026-09-01.

General consumer information: not legal, insurance, or financial advice. Requirements, coverage, and practices vary by state, policy, and manufacturer.

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